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Introduction 
 
The relationship between the two “Chinas” – the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s 
Republic of China (Mainland or China) – has shifted from hostile to dialogue-filled in the past few years. 
In particular, since the opening of Taiwan to Mainland investment in 2009 and the signing of the 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in February 2010, economic integration has 
accelerated substantially (Brown, Hempson-Jones, & Pennisi, J., 2010). However, many in and outside 
of Taiwan caution that the Mainland’s government is using economic integration as a way to increase 
its influence over Taiwan’s economy, so that it can then subsequently influence the island’s politics 
(Cole, 2013). 
 
The importance of this question extends far beyond East Asian regional politics, and has 
significant impacts on the future of the global political economy. In particular, it will likely shape 
Mainland China’s place in the global political and economic system as Taiwan’s claim to the title of the 
legitimate government of China presents a fundamental ideational challenge to the legitimacy of the 
Mainland state. Although this claim is no longer as central in Taiwanese politics as it was in the past, 
it nonetheless represents a long unresolved problem for the Mainland (Albert, 2016). Therefore, the 
way in which this relationship evolves will shed a lot of light as to the future direction of the Chinese 
state, and in particular, how it chooses to interact its neighbours.  
 
One particular area of economic integration that has not been thoroughly examined by the 
existing literature is how the increasing number of mergers and acquisitions of Taiwanese companies 
– especially in key sectors like high-technology (high-tech) electronics – by Chinese firms since the 
2009-10 period of economic liberalization might influence Taiwanese policy options and choices in the 
future.  
 
For all these reasons, this paper will attempt to answer the following question by examining 
the economic context of the relationship, as well as company-specific cases of mergers and 
acquisitions of high-tech firms based in Taiwan. The hope is that this macro and microeconomic 
analysis will help prove if indeed these investments are exposing the Taiwanese economy, and by 
extension the Taiwanese state, to political pressures from the Mainland (with the ultimate goal of 
facilitating reunification). As such, the research question for this paper is as follows: 
 
In the period between 2009 and 2016, to what extent has economic integration 
between Mainland China and Taiwan – especially in the high-tech sector – brought 
Taiwan closer to political reunification with the Mainland? 
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Literature Review 
  
In order to provide an adequate scope to this paper, the literature review will examine a 
variety of topics, beginning with an overview of the key term, economic integration, and then review 
the literature regarding the potential use of economic means by China to coerce Taiwan politically. 
While it will not be examined in detail, for the purpose of this paper, political reunification will be 
defined in a strict sense to mean the unification of two or more states into one state, with one 
government at the state-level. The reason this definition was chosen is that this is China’s ultimate 
goal with regards to Taiwan.  
 
Key Terms 
 
Economic Integration 
 
Defining Economic Integration 
 
Scholars describe economic integration in wide variety of terms, so it is appropriate to start 
by examining several possible definitions, and then establish a broad working definition in order to 
specify the scope of the subsequent research and analyses. This is by no means the only definition, 
and its purpose is simply functional.  
 
In his landmark work The Theory of Economic Integration, Balassa (1961) described integration 
as both a process and a state of affairs that reduces discrimination between the national economies 
of states. He further makes a distinction between integration and cooperation, where the former 
includes any measures aimed at lessening discrimination (e.g. free trade agreements), while the later 
implies actual actions taken to overcome discrimination (e.g. implementing those agreements) 
(Balassa, 1961, p. 1-3). Therefore Balassa makes an important distinction is made between the formal 
and the actual; implying a difference between what is agreed upon and what is actually implemented 
to integrate national economies.  
 
In a similar broad manner, Hancock (2009), in her book Regional Integration: Choosing 
Plutocracy, focuses on the vehicles of economic integration, formal agreements, and classifies them 
by their depth (shallow and deep), type (monetary and trade), and governance structure (plutocratic, 
supranational, and intergovernmental).  
 
 These partial explanations can be combined to form a complete, working definition for this 
paper: economic integration is the abolition of economic discrimination within an area, with the level 
of abolition determined by the depth, type, and governance structure of the framework (formal and 
informal) that enables this integration. The author’s addition here is of the distinction between formal 
frameworks (e.g. agreements) and informal frameworks (e.g. cultural ties) that enable successful 
economic integration.  
 
Measuring Economic Integration 
 
 In their compilation of approaches to measuring economic integration, Nitsch and Wolf (2013) 
point out that there are two methodological issues regarding the measurement of trade (a key driver 
of economic integration): trade values are unobservable (i.e. it is hard to isolate and correlate the 
effects of trade or trade agreements on a nation), and trade costs are endogenous (i.e. as an 
independent variable, they are correlated with factors that cause it to deviate from the real value).  
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 Similarly Bergstrand (2013) points out that there is little evidence to support the anecdote 
that lower trade barriers result in an increase in international trade as there is a lack in quantitative 
evidence to prove this trade-cost elasticity.  
  
Balassa (1961) asserts that the most important criterion for evaluating the effects of economic 
integration is its dynamic effect on the growth of national income (e.g. GDP). In other words, how 
integration expands the possible national income, not merely enables a country to attain the income 
possible when the economy operates at its most productive level – i.e. the static effect of integration 
(Balassa, 1961, p. 10-15). The dynamic effect is affected by: technological progress, allocation of 
investment, inter-industry relations in production and investment, and the certainty/consistency in 
economic decisions. If one considers this, the static effect, and other indicators – like income 
distribution, regional patterns of production and income, and the stability of participating states’ 
economies – a complete picture can be rendered (Balassa, 1961, p. 10-15). Therefore, Balassa’s claim 
is quite convincing as it includes a mix of quantitative and qualitative factors in measuring the effects 
of integration.  
 
The Use of Economic Integration for Political Purposes by China in Taiwan 
 
 The previously outlined warming of cross-strait relations has led to formal economic 
integration in the form agreements that have enabled extensive trade and investment across the strait. 
However, the reactions are quite mixed when with regards to the implications of these developments.   
 
 With regards to positive claims, Scott Kastner (2010) of the University of Maryland explained 
in his testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission that cross-strait 
integration makes military conflicts less likely. This, he argues, is due to three processes. 
First, economic integration raises the costs of military conflict for both sides…[s]econd, 
economic integration can potentially foster a transformation in the policy preferences of the 
two governments…[t]hird, cross-Strait economic integration makes it easier for Beijing to 
coerce Taiwan or to signal resolve credibly without resorting to military measures”. (Kastner, 
2010, p. 2) 
 
Although the last point is not likely to be seen as positive by the Taiwanese state or people, 
Kastner’s hypothesis does nonetheless follow the general logic of liberal institutionalist theory that 
economic integration reduces the ability for states to fight amongst each other. 
 
 However, there are many negative claims that point to future consequences of this integration 
– especially with regards to its momentum in bring about political integration. Michael Cole (2013) in 
his article for The Diplomat “No Missiles Required: How China is Buying Taiwan’s "Re-Unification"”, 
argues that the previously mentioned Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement has indeed 
enabled an influx of much-needed Chinese capital into the recently underperforming Taiwanese 
economy. However, this inflow has simultaneously enabled these Mainland investors to acquire 
controlling stakes in previously-closed manufacturing and service sector firms – opening the door for 
wholesale economic domination (Cole, 2013). Although his claim is a little vague with regards to 
evidence, its fundamental logic nonetheless remains quite sound: opening up domestic sectors to 
investors from a hostile country can have negative long-term consequences.  
 
 Tanner (2007), in his book “Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to 
Use”, goes into more detail by summarizing the concerns of a various analysts regarding the potential 
trajectory of warming cross-strait economic relations, especially with regards to the potential for 
eventual reunification. These can be further condensed into four points. One, economic integration 
could reduce political support for self-defence capabilities Two, it could intimidate Taiwanese political 
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elites and regular voters into becoming an ‘unwilling’ lobby for China’s economic and political interests. 
Three, it could lead to the hollowing out of the Taiwanese economy by transferring important 
economic activities (e.g. the high-tech sector) to the Mainland. And four, provide a vehicle by which 
China could directly damage the Taiwanese economy (e.g. negatively affecting stock prices) (Tanner, 
2007, p. 2-3, 13-9). He asserts that these claims have been openly proclaimed by Chinese officials who 
assert that these policy’s ultimate aims are “using people to pressure the officials…and using 
businesspeople to pressure politicians” (Tanner, 2007, p. 4). However, he convincingly shows that 
China’s willingness and effectiveness to use any leverage it might already have over Taiwan is very 
limited – as was apparent by the absence of any kind of economic sanctions during the highly 
militarized 1995-6 and 1999-2000 cross-strait crises (Tanner, 2007, p. 5). He asserts that Taiwan’s 
vulnerability to economic coercion from China is affected by, one, the relative importance of China on 
Taiwan’s economy, two, Taiwan’s ability to forego economic relations with China (in the event of a 
dispute), three, the effectiveness of Taiwanese policy makers in minimizing China’s economic leverage, 
and four, the specific nature of Beijing’s demands (especially in the context of historic relations) 
(Tanner, 2007, p. 6-7, 20-5). Especially the last point would naturally imply that only modest (but not 
necessarily trivial) policy demands would likely have any chance of succeeding in altering Taiwanese 
political behaviour. As such, he effectively argues that economic coercion (by itself) would have little 
success in subverting the Taiwanese state, or affecting its disintegration. 
 
 Kahler and Kastner (2006) in their article “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: 
Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in the Journal of Peace 
Research distinguish between three general strategies that drive states to expand their economic 
interactions with other states. They are: one, conditional engagement (i.e. increasing economic 
interactions on the condition that the other state changes its behaviour), two, unconditional 
engagement for the purpose of constraining (i.e. with the goal of increasing the costs of military 
conflicts), and three, unconditional engagement with the purpose of transforming behaviours (to ones 
more favourable to the initiator) (Kahler & Kastner, 2006, p. 527). The authors argue that Taiwan has 
broadly pursued a conditional strategy that has aimed to reduce threats of force being used against 
Taiwan by China, end Taiwan’s international isolation (that was largely engineered by China), and win 
Taiwan recognition as an equal political entity. Conversely, they argue China has pursued an 
unconditional engagement strategy which aims to transformation Taiwan’s political system by 
strengthening the position of those political actors that support a stable cross-strait relationship; and 
weakening the positon of those that aspire for independence (Kahler & Kastner, 2006, p. 534-5). They 
convincingly argue that Taiwan has been generally unsuccessful with its strategy – especially in 
comparison to China – largely due to the fact that the drastic steps required to enact this kind of 
strategy were (and are) very difficult to carry out in an increasingly democratic Taiwan (Kahler & 
Kastner, 2006, p. 536). 
 
 Norris (2016) seems to agree with this conclusion as he argues that the increased economic 
ties between China and Taiwan have resulted in a general shifted political discussions on Taiwan away 
from declaring independence (an extremely sore point for China) in the early 2000s, towards 
maintaining the status-quo at the present movement. He ascribes this to increasing economic ties 
between the two states, especially with regards to the increasing ties between Taiwanese companies 
and the Mainland in general, which played a crucial role in changing political (and ultimately social) 
attitudes towards reunification (Norris, 2016). However, he makes it very clear that China has been 
very ineffective at using its economic power directly with regards to Taiwan as it is unable to satisfy 
the most fundamental condition for successful economic statecraft: the ability to direct or control the 
behaviour of economic actors (Norris, 2016, p. 26). He identifies five key factors that determine a 
state’s ability to control commercial actors: one, the number of commercial actors, two, the extent to 
which the government’s agents act in unison, three, the alignment of the state’s and commercial 
agents’ agendas, four, the reporting nature between the two types of actors, and five, the relative 
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difference in resource endowments. Based on these, he convincingly argues that the Chinese state is 
weak at exercising direct control over Taiwanese commercial actors primarily because, one, actual 
power within the Chinese state is quite divided between national and local governments, two, the 
Chinese state’s goals are not aligned with Taiwanese commercial agents’ goals, and three, Taiwanese 
firms have a weak relationship with the Chinese state (i.e. a regulatory one) (Norris, 2016, p. 112-3). 
While perhaps this approach oversimplifies the relationship between these two types of actors, it is 
useful as it convincingly argues against the Chinese state’s ability to successfully directly influence 
Taiwanese firms – and by extension, the Taiwanese state and society.  
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Research Design 
 
The nature of the research question naturally requires the use of a within-case research design. 
In order to produce a balanced analysis, the research will be structures in two parts. Part 1 will broadly 
by examining the economic nature of Sino-Taiwanese relations. Part 2 will delve into Taiwan’s key 
industry, high-tech electronics, and examine three attempted acquisitions by a Chinese firm in this 
sector.  
 
Furthermore, in line with the previously established multi-facetted definition of economic 
integration, it has been determined that process tracing will be the most appropriate vehicle of 
examination. By constructing a story of how various economically integrating forces (the independent 
variables) have been impacting political integration with Mainland China (the dependent variable), it 
should be easier to produce a clearer picture as to the actual depth and trajectory of integration (i.e. 
the objective of the research question). In this sense, the level of integration will be measured by a 
mix of qualitative and quantitative data in order to produce a balanced conclusion.  
 
Although this paper was originally envisioned to include interviews and other primary sources 
in its research component, due to financial restraints this was not possible. For this reason, a wide 
variety of qualitative and quantitative secondary sources were used – with a particular focus on books, 
academic journals, newspaper articles, government databases, company annual reports, and 
company press releases. All figures in this paper were produced by the author from data from these 
sources. Also, while these sources come from around the world, they are all written in English (with 
the exception of some of the government statistics). While the author is proficient in Mandarin 
Chinese, his level is currently insufficient to be able to read academic works; thereby limited the 
perspectives examined in this paper.  
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Research and Analysis 
 
Part 1: The Political and Economic Context of Sino-Taiwanese Relations 
 
It is necessary to begin with an examination of the context in which Sino-Taiwanese 
relationship takes place in, as not only will this help one to construct the story of economic integration 
(i.e. engage in process tracing), but it will also help one to understand the kinds of pressures the 
Taiwanese side may face when considering its options regarding integration. As such, the history of 
China-Taiwan relations will be examined, followed by an overview of the key macro and 
microeconomic situations in both countries, and finally trends in key economic indicators will be 
examined to help produce a broad picture of the context.  
 
A History of China-Taiwan Relations 
 
 According to Eleanor Albert (2016) in her Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, Taiwan 
has been governed independently from the remainder of China since the flight of the defeated 
nationalist government to the island after their defeat at the hands of the Communists in 1949. 
Although initially recognized as the legitimate Chinese government by the United Nations, the United 
States (US), and most of the international community, the government of Taiwan lost this status in 
the 1970s following the loss of its seat as “China” in the United Nations in 1971, and the formal 
recognition of the People’s Republic of China as “China” by the US in 1979 (Albert, 2016).  
 
 Albert (2016) continues by explaining that, although hostile for many decades, the 
relationship between the two sides has dramatically improved in recent years. Although tensions 
briefly escalated following the passing of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law by the Mainland – a direct result 
of the re-election of the pro-independent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan – there has 
been a dramatic rapprochement between the two sides since the return of the broadly pro-
reunification Kuomintang (KMT) party under President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 (Albert, 2016; Manthorpe, 
2005). Albert (2016) goes on to explain that President Ma signed more than twenty agreements with 
the Mainland government in his eight years in power (2008-2016) – most notably the formal opening 
of 100 sectors to Mainland investment in 2009 (Brown et al., 2010) and the ECFA in 2010 – lifting 
barriers to trade and investment, as well as fostering cross-strait travel.  
 
Although Tsai Ing-wen’s landslide victory of the 2016 presidential elections in Taiwan 
represented a major win for the DDP, Austin Ramzy (2016) notes in his article “Taiwan President Takes 
Cautious Line on China at Inauguration” for the New York Times, that the President stress her 
commitment to the status-quo in her inauguration speech; a severe departure from the party’s 
previous stance. As such, it appears that the question of independence has been replaced with to what 
extent relations – especially economic ones – should be maintained or allowed on the island. This 
makes this paper’s research question especially crucial, as some level of economic interaction with 
the Mainland has become an accepted reality (at least politically) in Taiwan – with the focus now 
shifting to what this rapprochement means for the long-term sovereignty of the island state.   
 
Taiwan’s Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Profile 
 
 Having briefly examined the history of bilateral relations, it is now appropriate to outline a 
general macro and microeconomic profile for Taiwan, as this will not only help one to further 
contextualize this relationship, but it will also enable one to determine the exact importance of the 
high-tech sector (which until now has only been assumed to be important to the Taiwanese economy). 
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Following the nationalist government’s move to Taiwan, the island’s economy has undergone 
dramatic changes. From the onset of industrialization in the 1950s, the state has played a very active 
role in guiding the local economy. They began by reforming land ownership (which increased 
productivity and farmers’ incomes, thereby producing additional funds for industrialization) (Koo, 
1966), and focusing on developing an export-driven manufacturing economy (through tax incentives 
and state-owned enterprises [SOEs]) (Hsiao & Lee, 2014). This strategy allowed Taiwan to attract 
foreign transnational corporations (TNCs) that produced locally for export, and shielded domestic, 
largely non-internationally-competitive producers from foreign competition (while absorbing the 
technical knowledge required to compete globally) (Schwartz, 2010, p. 249-50). The 1980s brought 
with them the lifting of martial law, and subsequently, democratization and the reduction of state’s 
role in the economy (especially regarding the number of SOEs) (Hsiao & Lee, 2014). Furthermore, in 
this period, Taiwan began moving away from low value-added goods, like textiles, so that by the end 
of the 1990s its economy was one of the world’s largest producer of semi-conductors and high-tech 
electronics (like laptops and computer monitors) (Schwartz, 2010), p. 253). However, as domestic 
labour costs began to rise, the country’s firms began outsourcing more and more of their labour-
intensive assembly to the Mainland, where costs were considerably cheaper (Schwartz, 2010, p. 253). 
As such, the importance of the high-tech sector to Taiwan’s economy – especially with regards to its 
future trajectory – quickly becomes evident.  
 
 Furthermore, Taiwan’s state-centric development model produced a particular version of 
capitalism that has simultaneously allowed Taiwanese firms and individuals to thrive and grow, and 
has exposed it to some of its biggest challenges. One of the most enduring features of its economy is 
the prevalence of family-owned businesses – especially small and medium sized ones (SMEs) – that 
often form intricate business groups1. Rooted in Confucianism – which places emphasis on family and 
filial duty (Hwang et al., 2009) – this form of firm ownership puts emphasis on growing family wealth 
(rather than the firm itself) and has resulted in high levels of horizontal integration and (Hsiao and Lee, 
2014). Furthermore, these firms have relied heavily on other ethnically Chinese individuals or 
ethnically Chinese-owned firms abroad when expanding their production overseas – resulting in 
strong linkages based on kindship and ethnicity across national borders (Hsiao and Lee, 2014, p. 254). 
As such, it apparent that the firms that constitute the Taiwanese economy are deeply rooted within 
their cultural context; giving them a relatively clear purpose for existing and growing, as well as 
exposing them to a variety problems arising from this very ridge and inward-looking perspective. It is 
very important to take note of this considering that the subsequent part of this paper will examine 
individual Taiwanese firms, which given this outline, are likely to behave in a conservative manner.  
 
Trends in GDP Indicators 
 
 Having a general understanding of the nature of the Taiwanese economy, as well as Sino-
Taiwanese relations, it is now appropriate to begin the quantitative portion of this portion of the paper 
by examining major trends in one of the most basic economic indicators: GDP (and the related GDP 
per capita). Although this indicator is limited in a variety of ways, nonetheless, it is hoped this data will 
expose the economic realities faced by both parties; and as such, further contextualize the subsequent 
analyses with respect to the research question. Due to the fact that no major international 
organization (UN, IMF, World Bank, etc.) records statistic on Taiwan, the following graphs have been 
prepared from multiple sources and so can only be examined at a cursory level.  
 
Figures 1 through 4 make it is apparent that while both countries’ GDPs and GDPs per capita 
are rising, the annual growth rates for both countries differ dramatically. While China’s growth has 
                                                          
1 Business groups are legally separate, but formally or informally bound together (often due to overlapping 
management) (Chung & Mahmood, 2006).  
Marcin Zabinski – s1820656 – Thesis 
Page | 11  
 
been relatively stable year-on-year, Taiwan has experienced large fluctuations, with negative growth 
(i.e. contraction) in several years. This seems to suggest that the Taiwanese economy is not as dynamic 
as China’s and/or it is highly sensitive to changes. As such, it is becoming clearer as to why the new 
Taiwanese president is careful with regards to China (i.e. the rising economic power in the region). 
However, to what extent does Taiwan depend on trade and investment to and from China? The 
subsequent section will attempt to shed some light on this question, and therefore help determine 
the extent that economic interdependence might affect the political future of Taiwan (i.e. the research 
question).  
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017. 
Note: The World Bank was used to source this data as it is the opinion that it is more impartial (therefore more accurate) 
than national calculations (which can be subject to manipulation for a variety of reasons). Furthermore, data from the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China only includes data from 1991 onwards, making comparisons with Taiwan (which has 
data from 1982) harder. 
 
 
Source: National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan), 2017. 
Note: Values are in New Taiwanese Dollars (NTD) as the Taiwanese government – while pinning their GDP values to the 2011 
USD – presents all data in NTD. 
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Source: World Bank, 2017. 
 
 
Source: National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan), 2017. 
 
Trends in Trade and Overseas Investment Indicators 
 
 As one can see from Figure 5, the total value of Taiwan’s exports has been growing quite 
dynamically (apart from 2009), and has consistently been dominated by ‘heavy industry’ goods. While 
this figure is somewhat vague (as it includes everything from steel, to petroleum, to computer parts), 
it nonetheless underlines the fact that industry remains an extremely important component of the 
Taiwanese economy as it the main driver of money inflows from trade (which expand the economy). 
The opposite can be said of Figure 6, which shows that Taiwan is primarily importing agricultural 
products and raw goods, and relatively small amounts of capital goods (like machinery) or consumer 
goods (like clothing).  
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Source: National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan), n.d.b 
Note: Agricultural products constitute a very minor part of export, and are therefore barely visible in the figure above. 
 
 
Source: National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan), n.d.b 
Note: The Taiwanese government uses different categories for imports and exports, therefore caution should be used when 
comparing the two figures.   
 
 Furthermore, as is evident Figures 7 and 8, the relative importance of Taiwan’s various trade 
partners has quickly shifted over the last sixteen years; with China rising as the clearly dominant force 
in Taiwan’s trade landscape. Beginning with Figure 7, one can see that China quickly emerged from 
the lower-end of the top 10 partners in 2000 to overtake Hong Kong by 2004 as Taiwan’s largest export 
market – a position it has dominated to the present day by buying roughly twice as much goods as 
Hong Kong. The same is true for import values in Figure 8, where China rose to overtake Japan – a 
long-time dominant source of imports – in 2013. However, this transformation has also had 
considerable impact on the political sphere of the economy. As evident from Figure 9, one can see 
that not only does Taiwan have a large trade surplus with China, it is much larger than its trade 
surpluses with its traditional allies, and regional powers, the USA and Japan (with whom it has a deficit). 
This means that, on a ‘net’ level, more Chinese money from trade is flowing into Taiwan than from the 
USA or Japan. This means that Sino-Taiwanese trade – at least on this level – is more beneficial to the 
island’s economy than trade with its main allies; possibly alluding to why closer economic relations 
are being pursued and maintained by the island’s governments.  
 
 -
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
V
al
u
e 
(N
TD
)
B
ill
io
n
s
Year
Figure 5: Taiwanese Exports (2002-2015) (Stacked)
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Figure 6: Taiwanese Imports (2001-2015)(Stacked)
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Source: Bureau of Trade (Taiwan), n.d. 
 
  
Source: Bureau of Trade (Taiwan), n.d. 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Trade (Taiwan), n.d. 
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Figure 7: Taiwan Export Values, from Top 10 Partners in 2016 (2000-2016)
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Figure 8: Taiwan Import Values, from Top 10 Partners in 2016 (2000-2016)
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Figure 9: Taiwan's Balance of Trade with Regional Economic Powers 
(2000-2016)
China Japan United States
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 A similar story is revealed when one examines the levels of inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into Taiwan in Figure 10. As one can see, following the opening up of Taiwan to Mainland 
investment in 2009, Chinese FDI has not only grown dramatically, it has practically replaced all other 
sources of FDI (which never returned to pre-crisis levels). This means that now Chinese capital – not 
American or Japanese capital – is fueling new investments in the Taiwanese economy; a powerful shift 
that may have major implications for the future.  
 
 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2017. 
 
 The opposite can be said about Figure 11, where outward FDI to the Mainland has remained 
a minor component of Taiwanese investments abroad – with substancially larger sums going to 
countries like the USA or Japan. Nonetheless, when one closely examines the y-axises of both Figures 
10 and 11, one notices that the former is in millions, while the later is in billions of US Dollars. 
Therefore, if one compares the Chinese FDI flows to Taiwan with the Taiwanese FDI flows to China in 
Figure 12, one see that (while small in terms of overall Taiwanese FDI) Taiwan invests many times 
more into China than the inverse. In fact, in 2016, Taiwanese invested 31.7 times as much in the 
Mainland, as much their Mainland peers did on the island. While this figure is still much smaller than 
Taiwan’s trade surplus, nonetheless, the relationship appears to be bearing fruits on both sides of the 
strait. However, as Figure 1 revealed, it is important to remember that China’s economy (based on 
real GDP) is much larger Taiwan’s. As such, it is quite clear that Taiwan (on an economic level) benefits 
a lot more from bilateral economic relations – likely causing and reinforcing the previously-mentioned 
political shift from pursuing indepenance (which would undermine economic relations), to managing 
the increasing interdependance. With regards to the research question, this seems to reinforce 
behaviours that are aligned with or (at least) not opposed to China’s objctives. 
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Figure 10: New Inward FDI in Taiwan, by Source (1952-2016) (Stacked)
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Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2017. 
Note: the values before 1988 are relatively so small that they are not visible on this figure.  
 
 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2017. 
Note: balance of trade values before 2000 are relatively so small that they are not visible on this figure.  
 
Major Industries in Taiwan 
 
Overview  
  
Having outlined the general nature of bilateral relations, another economic area that needs 
to be explored is the nature of the Taiwanese economy itself. By understanding this, one will be able 
to further contextualize the implications of changing nature of Sino-Taiwanese economic relations, 
and so better understand how these changes impact the political reality faced by the island.   
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Figure 11: Outward FDI in Taiwan, by Destination 
(1952-2016) (Stacked) 
Mainland China Japan South Korea Hong Kong USA Rest of Asia Rest of the World
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Figure 12: Chinese-Taiwanese Bilateral FDI and Trade Balance
(1991-2016) (Areas Stacked, Line Not Stacked)
Taiwanese FDI in China Chinese FDI in Taiwan Taiwan's Balance of Trade with China
Chinese FDI in Taiwan Permitted 
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A good starting point for understanding the economic structure of Taiwan is by examining 
each of the three sectors of the economy. As one can see from Figure 13, Taiwan’s economy (as 
measured by GDP) has been strongly dominated by both the secondary and tertiary sectors since 1982 
(the earliest date data was available). While the tertiary sector has expanded its share of GDP, the 
secondary sector has nonetheless remained a major part of the economy.  
 
 
Source: National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan), n.d.a 
 
 
As is evident from Figure 14, the Taiwanese manufacturing sector is clearly dominated by the 
production of electronic parts and components as well as computers, electronic and optical products. 
Both categories dominate all three indicators shown in this figure.  
 
With regards to revenues and value of production (i.e. total cost of goods produced, without 
transportation and tariff charges), computers, electronic and optical products is clearly the most 
lucrative category of the manufacturing sector. This category’s revenues are not only highest in 
absolute terms, they are also the largest when compared to their value (cost) of production (i.e. this 
category is the most profitable). As such, this category of goods is ideal for growing an economy. One 
can speculate the reason for this large difference between revenues and production costs is a result 
of this category’s intensive requirement for intellectual capital, especially in the initial design phases. 
This means that the conditions necessary for their production are not easily replicable (due to factors 
like the quality of available labour, high initial cost, etc.) – making them relatively scarce, and therefore 
highly profitable. As such, it is very easy to understand why the Taiwanese government has nurtured 
the development of this industry, as was outlined at the beginning of this part of the paper.  
 
Furthermore, although electronic parts and components is another very large category in 
terms of revenues and value of production, however, its absolute revenue figures are much smaller 
than computers, electronic and optical products. Combined with relatively higher total cost of 
production, this implied that this category is relatively less profitable overall. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that this category is extremely important for Taiwan’s overall manufacturing landscape as it not only 
constitutes the second most profitable industrial category, but it is also a crucial input for the 
productions of computers, electronic and optical products; making it an essential component for the 
later to exist. Furthermore, as by far the largest employer in the manufacturing sector, this category 
is vital to overall prosperity of Taiwanese society by providing many jobs to the island’s inhabitants. 
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Figure 13: Taiwanese GDP by Sector 
(Chained 2011 NTD)(1982-2016)(Stacked) 
Primary Sector Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector
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Source: National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan), 2011 
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Figure 14: Manufacturing Sector Revenues, Value of Production, and Number of Persons 
Employed, by Category (2011)
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Source: National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan), 201
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Figure 15: Service Sector Revenues, Values of Production, and Number of Persons 
Employed, by Category (2011) 
Total Revenues, Year-End 2011 Total Values of Production, Year-End 2011
Number of Persons Employed Domestically, Year-End 2011
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 Similarly, as one can see from Figure 15, the Taiwan’s service sector is dominated by a single 
category: wholesale and retail trade. This category includes most activities in the retail supply chain, 
and is naturally a big component of any economy, developed or otherwise, as it caters to the everyday 
needs and wants of a country’s citizens. Therefore, although it is very large in all respects, its 
prominence is not unusual and therefore will not be a big component of this analysis. However, what 
is important to note is that all other categories in this figure are relatively very small. As one can see 
from Figure 16 – which aggregates the data in Figures C and D – the combined figures of (1) electronic 
parts and components, (2) computers, electronic and optical products, and (3) electrical equipment 
(i.e. the high-tech sector), while employing less people than the retail sector, earns more revenue at 
a smaller cost. This means that this category is more profitable to the economy than retail. As such, 
the distinction of this sector in the research question appears to be appropriate, as developments in 
this sector can broadly approximate the kinds of forces affecting the whole Taiwanese economy. For 
this reason, the high-tech sector will be the focus of the remainder of this paper.  
 
 
Source: National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan), 2011 
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Figure 16: Total Revenues, Value of Production, and Number of Persons 
Employed in Taiwan's Secondary and Teriary Sectors (2011)
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Summary of Part 1 
 
While Sino-Taiwanese relations have been hostile for the major of their history, the recent 
rapprochement on the economic front has resulted in 2009 relaxation on Chinese FDI in Taiwan, and 
the 2010 ECFA, which liberalized trade.  
 
Taiwan’s economy has undergone dramatic export-oriented industrialization, with a progression 
from low to high value-added goods, like semiconductors and other high-tech products. However, this 
sector is threated by rising relative labour costs as emerging economies (like China) upgrade their 
productive capabilities. Taiwan’s economy was and is heavily guided by state efforts, with small and 
medium sized family-owned businesses making up the bulk of the economy. While the GDPs and GDPs 
per capita in both China and Taiwan have been growing, both indicators have effectively plateaued in 
recent years for Taiwan; resulting in a stagnant economic situation.  
 
Taiwan’s exports have been slowly growing in volume over the last 15 years, with products made 
by heavy industry accounting for the vast majority of the value. Imports have grown at broadly similar 
levels, with raw materials consistently being the largest component. While trade values have remained 
stable with other major trading partners, China has grown to become Taiwan’s largest export and 
import market in the 2000-2016 period. Taiwan commands a sizeable trade surplus with China.  
 
Since allowing investment from the Mainland in 2009, Chinese FDI has effectively replaced all 
other sources for inward investment. On the other hand, Taiwanese investment abroad is far more 
diversified (with only a small percentage going towards China). Nonetheless, the Taiwanese invest far 
more in China than the inverse (however, this figure is still smaller than the trade surplus, resulting in 
a net positive inflow of money).  
 
While the service sector makes up the majority of Taiwan’s economy, the secondary sector still 
remains considerable, both in terms of size and importance to growth. In terms of revenues and 
persons employed, the high-tech sector is by far the largest component of the secondary sector. 
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Part 2: Examining the High-Tech Sector 
 
 In the second half of the research portion of this paper, the high-tech sector will be examined 
in detail in order to determine the extent and ramifications of any recent Chinese presence in this 
sector, in order to hopefully be able to project if (and if so, how) it might affect reunification. The high-
tech sector will be defined along the lines of the Electronics, Computers, and Components2 category 
in Figure 16: i.e. it will include all activities directly related to the production and sales of electronics 
and components, from micro-processors to LCD screens, and complete computers. The following 
analysis will begin with a brief history of the high-tech sector in Taiwan, then delve into the key 
industry data, and finally conclude with three case studies of firms in this sector who are experiencing 
large-scale Mainland investment. It is hoped that this research will reveal the exact nature and extent 
of Chinese interactions with this crucial sector, thus the Taiwanese economy in general – allowing for 
overall conclusions to be made with regards to the research question.  
  
History of the High-Tech Sector in Taiwan 
 
 Taiwan began transitioning away from the manufacturing of low value-added consumer goods 
to high value-added high-tech products in the 1970s with the establishment of the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute (ITRI) in Hsinchu, south of Taipei, in order to develop a domestic 
semiconductor industry (Mathews & Cho, 2000, p. 157-8).  At this time, the state along with the ITRI 
began developing Taiwan’s technological capabilities by attempting to close the knowledge gap with 
foreign firms through a variety of means, like licensing their dated technology (Mathews & Cho, 2000, 
p. 157-8). As the sector began to grow, the government created a specialist-intensive industrial park 
in Hsinchu around National Tsinghua University – the future Hsinchu Science Park, now also known as 
the Silicon Valley of Asia (Mathews & Cho, 2000, p. 159-60). 
 
In the 1980s, the sector began to expand away from state-owned technology firms with the 
establishment in 1987 of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) – originally 
as a joint venture with Philips – as the world’s first (and still largest) producer of other firms’ integrated 
circuits (i.e. chips) (Mathews & Cho, 2000, p. 160). Furthermore, during this period some of Taiwan’s 
most recognizable personal electronic companies began emerging as globally competitive firms. 
Notable examples including Acer and ASUS. With the appearance of many new firms in the 1990s, by 
the end of the decade Taiwan was able to produce semiconductors from start to finish: solidifying its 
position as one of the world’s preeminent semiconductor manufacturers (Mathews & Cho, 2000, p. 
162). It was also during this period that many mobile telecommunication technology firms began 
appearing in Taiwan – such as HTC – allowing the island to also compete in the emerging mobile 
revolution (in fact, HTC’s Dream [T-Mobile G1] was the first mobile phone to run on the Android 
operating system) (Holson, 2008).  
 
While over the next decade (2000-2009) many Taiwanese high-tech firms emerged as global 
leaders in their fields – a notable example being Foxconn, the world’s largest electronics contract 
manufacturer, which assembles most Apple products and gamming consoles (Dean, 2007) – the 
industry as a whole has plateaued due to a general lack of innovation in recent years. Taiwan’s 
competitive advantage, amongst other things, was largely based on relatively low labour costs that 
allowed the island to sell high-tech goods at comparatively low prices (Greenwald, 2017). However, 
as China and other emerging economies upgrade their productive capabilities, it is clear that this 
advantage cannot be sustained into the future (Greenwald, 2017).  
 
                                                          
2 Electronics, Computers, and Components is the combination of three categories, (1) electronic parts and 
components, (2) computers, electronic and optical products, and (3) electrical equipment. 
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Once again, the state appears to be stepping in to try and help reinvent the sector. In 2016, it 
laid out a plan to help move the country towards so-called “innovation-driven growth” by focusing on 
five areas: smart machinery, Asia’s Silicon Valley (i.e. high-tech), bio-tech and pharmaceuticals, green 
energy, national defense, and a circular (green) economy (2016 Industrial Development Taiwan, R.O.C., 
2016). Whether or not the state will succeed in creating a true Silicon Valley by utilizing the Internet 
of Things3, cloud computing, and other technology as well as encouraging venture capitalists, is 
uncertain at this point. However, one factor that is key to this plan is quite apparent: capital inflows. 
And as Figure 10 in the previous part shows, this capital is increasingly coming solely from the 
Mainland. This naturally has political ramifications, if the Taiwanese state continues prioritizing the 
development of this sector as the main engine of growth.  
 
Key Industry Data  
 
 Now that the industry’s current position has been contextualized within its historic 
development, it is now appropriate to examine the industry from the quantitative side in order to see 
how the above-mentioned developments affected it, and ultimately, what they mean for its future.  
 
Firstly, Figures 18a and 18b below illustrates the value of production of the various sub-
categories of the high-tech sector (as delineated by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs). Although 
the value of production’s usefulness as a metric is limited due to the fact that it does not account for 
varying gross profit margins4 (and therefore it does not necessarily reflect revenues or gross profits5), 
nonetheless these figures are useful as they can approximate the scale of production, and by extension, 
provide an idea as to revenues earned by each sub-categories. While the data used for both graphs is 
identical, Figure 17a is constructed as a line graph in order to show trends in values for each sub-
category individually on one plane. Conversely, Figure 17b is constructed as a stacked area graph in 
order to show changes in the relative shares of each sub-category of the total value of production. As 
is evident from Figure 17a, the Taiwanese high-tech sector really began growing aggressively after the 
mid-1990s, with two sub-categories emerging as the clearly dominant segments of this sector: 
integrated circuits (i.e. semiconductors) and liquid crystal panels (LCD panels). As one can also see 
from Figure 17b, integrated circuits has had a large share of the total value of production since 1993, 
while liquid crystal panels emerged as an important component of this figure since approximately 
2001. The conclusions from both figures underline the transformations discussed in the previous 
section, especially with regards to Taiwan’s emergence as a hub for semiconductor production.  
 
 With regards to the Mainland Chinese influence on this sector, as Figure 18 reveals, since FDI 
from China was permitted in Taiwan in 2009, high-tech manufacturing has received by-far the largest 
share of the investments – both in terms of value and number of cases (instances) – in the 
manufacturing sector of the economy. However, the Chinese investment in the retail and wholesale 
category was larger by approximately 109.6 million USD (or 1.3 times larger). While the difference is 
not extreme, it nonetheless shows that Mainland investors have not solely focused on the high-tech 
sector, and have invested in the largest service sector category as well (recall Figure 15).  Two other 
categories that have been included as separate categories in this figure are research and development 
(R&D) and venture capital6, as both are significant to the future growth of the innovation-intensive 
high-tech sector. As one can see from this figure, the values for either category are not very large, 
implying that only a small component of Mainland investments has likely gone directly activities – like 
start-ups – that have fueled this desired innovation-lead growth in other countries.
                                                          
3 The Internet of Things (IoT) is the exchange of data between various physical devices, like phones, vehicles, 
heart monitors, buildings etc. for the purpose of integrating the digital and physical worlds.  
4 Gross Profit Margin = Gross Profit / Revenue 
5 Gross Profit = Revenue - Cost of Goods Sold = Revenue - (Value of Production + Transport + Tariffs) 
6 Venture capital are funds given by investors for high-risk projects, especially start-ups.  
Marcin Zabinski – s1820656 – Thesis 
Page | 24  
 
 
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, n.d. 
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Figure 17a: Production Values of Taiwanese High-Tech Sector, by Category (1981-2016)
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Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, n.d. 
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Figure 17b: Production Values of Taiwanese High-Tech Sector, by Category (1981-2016)
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Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, n.d. 
 
Company Profiles 
 
 Having established a general outline of the sector, it is now appropriate to examine several case 
studies of firms in this sector that have experienced increase contact with Mainland China, especially 
regarding equity investments (i.e. the purchasing of shares). While there have been many Taiwanese firms 
in this position, the three largest and most controversial ones all concern the attempts made by Tsinghua 
Unigroup Ltd. (Tsinghua) to purchase considerable portions of shares in major Taiwanese semiconductor 
firms. Apart from the sheer size of these transactions (US$ 2.7 billion in total), what makes Tsinghua 
especially problematic for many Taiwanese is that this firm has effectively been chosen as the Chinese 
state’s champion for realizing its dream of becoming a high-tech superpower (Chips on their Shoulders, 
2016). Founded as a subsidiary of Tsinghua University – China’s top science and technology institution – 
the firm has received special patronage and funding from Chinese elites (especially from the state and its 
various agencies) (Weinland, 2017). Therefore, it can be assumed that Tsinghua broadly acts according to 
the Chinese state’s directives in order to accomplish its economic aspirations. As such, even though the 
three companies that will be examined are not the largest in the high-tech sector (see Figure 19), their 
experiences with Tsinghua represent some of the most concrete examples of interactions between 
economic and political concerns in Sino-Taiwanese relations. For this reason, they merit special attention 
as they will provide concrete examples that will help answer the research question.  
 
 
Source: Fortune Global 500, 2017  
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Siliconware Precision Industries Company, Ltd. (SPIL) 
 
Company Overview 
 
 Based in Taichung on Taiwan’s industrial west coast, SPIL was established in 1984 and has since 
grown to become the world’s third largest semiconductor packaging7 and testing company (Siliconware 
Precision Industries Co., Ltd., 2017a). Following its first listing on the Taipei Stock Exchange in 1993 and 
the NASDAQ in 2000, the company experienced a series of mergers and acquisitions with other companies 
in the sector (Milestones, n.d.). This allowed it to grow in size and productive capabilities, and earning it 
the golden award from the Ministry of Economic Affairs for being amongst Taiwan’s top 10 
exporter/importer for seven consecutive years (Milestones, n.d.). The company’s 24,000 employees are 
spread across SPIL’s eight factories (of which four are in Taichung, three are in Hsinchu, and one is in 
Suzhou, China) and its various offices in Taiwan, China, Japan, Singapore and the USA (SPIL Overview and 
Fact Sheet, n.d.). The company now produces leadframe and substrate packages for semiconductors, and 
appears to be successfully developing newer, thinner versions of its products in order to meet the 
changing demands of the firms that use their chips (Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd., 2017a). 
 
Key Financials  
 Source: Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd., 2017a.      Source: Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd., 2017a. 
 
As one can see from Figure 20 above, SPIL’s revenues from operations have been growing steadily 
over the last few years; implying either growth in number of customers, greater sales volumes, higher 
prices, or several or all of these factors. At the same time, profits and total asset values have been stable 
(though slightly decreasing), signaling that the company has not really experienced any concrete growth 
during this period. As such, SPIL appears to be operating less optimally that might appear from revenues. 
As one can see from Figure 21, SPIL’s operations are geared towards customers in North America as well 
as China and Taiwan – signalling that while SPIL has few target markets, they are in fact the most important 
ones. 
                                                          
7 Packaging refers to the casing of a semiconductor (which is usually metal, plastic, glass, or ceramic, unlike the 
semiconductor, which is made from silicon). The purpose of the packaging is to hold the semiconductors (and the 
circuits on/between them) in place, and protect them from external forces. 
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Source: Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd., 2017a. 
  
 Figure 22 reveals that SPIL’s performance has been gradually worsening in recent years. The debt 
ratio8 – i.e. the proportion of loans to assets – has been steadily increasing over this period, signifying that 
SPIL has been taking on more loans relative to all the things that the company owns or is owed. While not 
necessarily bad, this could be a sign of over-leveraging (i.e. over-reliance on debt) on the part of the firm, 
which is dangerous if the firm’s revenues to continue to increase at a mild pace (as it implies a greater risk 
of bankruptcy). With regards to the return on total assets9 – i.e. the firm’s effectiveness at using assets to 
produce profit – this indicator has been fluctuating between 6.3% and 10.4%, a considerable year-on-year 
difference. The same can be said of the net profit margin10 – i.e. how much of every NTD earned through 
sales is turned into profit – which fluctuates between 8.5% and 14.1%. While not necessarily unusual, 
these variations lead one to believe that the company’s ability to produce a profit (whether through the 
effective use of assets, or through controlling of expenses) is highly variable. What is even more 
concerning is that the average inventory turnover11 – i.e. how many times inventory is sold each year – 
has gone considerably downwards; implying that less inventory is sold throughout the year than 
previously. This may be part of the reason why revenues started dropping after 2014 in Figure 20.  
 
Interactions with Mainland China 
 
SPIL’s operations in China are spilt between the importing of the firm’s Taiwanese-made chips, 
and selling ones made locally through its wholly-owned subsidiary in Suzhou: Siliconware Technology 
Limited. This subsidiary operates a US$145 million facility, where they preform both packaging assembly 
and testing (Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd., 2017a).  
 
                                                          
8 Debt ratio = total liabilities / total assets 
9 Return on total assets = income (i.e. profit) before interest and taxes / total assets 
10 Net profit margin = net income (i.e. profit) / revenue 
11 Average inventory turnover = cost of goods sold (i.e. value of production) / average inventory 
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In December 2015, Tsinghua announced its intentions to spend US$ 1.7 billion for a 24.9% stake 
in SPIL (Dou, 2015). However, with the approach of the Taiwanese presidential elections in January 2016 
– where the future of economic relations between Taiwan and the Mainland was at the foreground – 
SPIL’s management decided to postpone its January shareholder vote regarding the proposal (Wu, 2016a). 
One of the biggest sources of opposition to the deal originated from Advanced Semiconductor Engineering 
Inc. (ASE), one of SPIL’s biggest rivals and its largest shareholder (owning 32% of SPIL’s shares) (Wu, 2016a). 
Apart from political considerations, it appears that ASE’s concerns were also very economical in nature, 
as it has repeatedly put forward offers to buy large portions of SPIL’s shares, in hostile takeover bids.  
 
Finally in April 2016, SPIL announced that it would suspend plans to sell any shares to Tsinghua 
until President Tsai’s new government – who during the campaign argued against the deal  (Cheng & Wu, 
2016) – clarified its positon on investments from the Mainland (Wu, 2016a). One June 30, 2016, SPIL and 
ASE announced that both companies’ boards had come to an agreement where ASE would purchase 100% 
of SPIL’s shares, and establishing a holding company that will own both entities (Siliconware Precision 
Industries Co., Ltd., 2016b). On November 18, 2016, the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission gave its approval 
to the merger, meaning that both companies now need approvals from their shareholders as well as 
certain anti-trust bodies in order to finalize the agreement (Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd., 
2016c). As such, it appears that Tsinghua’s proposal was defeated in large part by the firm’s origin and 
assumed political affiliation; which is only underlined by the fact that SPIL’s management preferred to join 
forces with a ‘hostile’ domestic competitor, than a large firm from the Mainland. 
 
Implications for the Research Question 
 
  This case study reveals that social and political pressures had a powerful effect on this particular 
Taiwanese company’s approach to investments from the Mainland. In SPIL case, the firm had been 
growing very gradually over the last 5 years (like the Taiwanese economy as a whole), and was besieged 
by hostile acquisition attempts from its competitor and largest shareholder, ASE. While the acquisition 
proposed by Tsinghua would have diluted ASE’s influence over SPIL, and effectively stopped any 
acquisition attempts, uncertainties over shareholder and regulatory approval ultimately seemed to have 
pushed the firm to abandon this deal. Instead the company agreed to a merger with ASE on terms far 
more equitable than the original hostile bids. While it is hard to tell if SPIL used Tsinghua as leverage to 
get a more favourable deal with ASE, or if the merger was an attempt to make the best of a difficult 
situation, the result was the same: SPIL did not receive an inflow of cash from the sale of its shares to 
Tsinghua. Amongst other things, this means less new funding for R&D (although it is important to note 
that undoubtedly SPIL’s development capabilities will improve after the merger due to new synergies 
between the firms). As such, it appears that, even though officially Chinese firms can now invest in firms 
in Taiwan’s key sector, local firms are still very responsive to local social and political pressures. This would 
imply, at least in this case, that Chinese state-supported firms (and by extension, the Chinese state) do 
not wield strong authority over Taiwanese firms – and therefore, by extension the Taiwanese economy 
and political sphere. An examination of the subsequent two cases will hopefully reveal if this pattern is 
consistent, and therefore indicative of a weak translation of economic integration with political influence. 
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Powertech Technology Inc. (Powertech) 
 
Company Overview 
 
 Founded in 1997 in Hsinchu, Powertech specializes in a variety of services related to the second 
major portion of semiconductor production called backend of the line12 (BEOL) as well as packaging 
(Company Profile, n.d.). The company grew quickly, taking on orders from major international high-tech 
firms like Toshiba within 2 years of its founding (Powertech Technology Inc., 2017). Following its initial 
public offering (IPO) on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2004, the company began diversifying into the 
production of newer products, like MicroSD Cards, and as a result began constructing new production 
plants. Powertech current employs approximately 15,000 employees across 6 plants (of which two are in 
Taiwan [Hsinchu and Chunan], two are in China [Suzhou and Xi’an], and one each in Singapore and Japan) 
(Company Profile, n.d.). The company currently produces a broad range of products, like memory 
components (like DRAMs13), and packaging, and appears to be investing in emerging high-tech trends like 
the Internet of Things (IoT) (Powertech Technology Inc., 2017). 
 
Key Financials  
 
Source: Powertech Technology Inc., 2017            Source: Powertech Technology Inc., 2017 
 
As Figure 23 reveals that, while Powertech’s revenues from operations have been relatively stable 
over the last few years, they have been very low relative to costs. As such, a slight drop in revenues below 
NTD 40 billion appears to automatically lead to a net loss for the year. This can be partially explained by 
the increase in total assets, as this is generally tied with major expenditures in the short term. Nonetheless, 
these figures reveal that Powertech is in a potentially precarious financial situation. With regards to Figure 
24, unlike SPIL, Powertech appears to be targeting developed markets, with Japan by far the largest 
destination for its products. This is surprising given that the company has two plants in China. 
                                                          
12 It is at this point where the various individual devices that will give the chip its processing and/or memory 
capabilities (i.e. transistor, resistors, etc.) get connected together with wiring on the semiconductor (silicon) wafers, 
along with the addition of insulation and bonding sites for connecting the complete wafers with the packaging.  
13 DRAM, or Dynamic Random Access Memory is a type of RAM that gradually losses the data stored on it.  
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Source: Powertech Technology Inc., 2017 
 
 Figure 25 shows that Powertech’s performance has been gradually improving over the past few 
years. While Powertech’s debt ratio14 has been roughly stable over the last 5 years, it remains quite high 
(its value reaching nearly 50% in 2013). This means that Powertech likely has a large loan volume that has 
likely not really decreased in the last three years due to the total asset increase visible for 2014-16 in 
Figure 23. As with SPIL, this over-leveraging puts the firm a dangerous positon as it makes bankruptcy a 
real threat. Apart from increasing revenues, a way to combat this trend in the short-term is to seek equity 
investments (e.g. through the sale of shares). With regards to the return on assets15, Powertech’s figures 
have risen from 6.2% to 8.1% (apart from the outlier year, 2013). This signifies both an improvement in 
the firm’s effectiveness at using its assets to generate profit, as well as proves that the investments in new 
assets (which were mostly capital assets, like the new Xi’an plant in 2015) were beneficial to firm’s 
performance. The same can be said about Powertech’s ability to transform revenues into profits, as (apart 
from the outlier year) the company’s net profit margin16 has been steadily improving over the last few 
years. This could be the result of a number of effectiveness improving actions, including growing revenue 
(which has occurred, see Figure 23) and the relative reduction of expenses (i.e. greater efficiency). 
However, the drop in Powertech’s inventory turnover17 indicates that the firm is not able to sell as much 
inventory as it did in the past. While this does not seem to have had a visible effect on revenues (as these 
have risen in this period), unless the profit margins on Powertech’s products have increased, this could 
seriously hamper revenue growth in the future.  
 
                                                          
14 Debt ratio = total liabilities / total assets. It shows the proportion of loans to assets (and therefore the firm’s 
financial health). 
15 Return on total assets = income (i.e. profit) before interest and taxes / total assets. It shows the firm’s 
effectiveness at using assets to produce profit 
16  
17 Average inventory turnover = cost of goods sold (i.e. value of production) / average inventory. It shows how 
many times inventory is sold that year. 
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Figure 25: Powertech's Key Ratios
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Interactions with Mainland China 
 
 Powertech has two wholly-owned semiconductor assembly and testing facilities in China, one in 
Suzhou and a recently-opened one in Xi’an (Powertech Technology Inc., 2017). The plant in Suzhou was 
acquired by Powertech from Spansion Holdings (of Singapore) in 2009, and was the company’s first, 
formal entrance on the Chinese market.  
 
 Similarly to SPIL, on October 30, 2015, Tsinghua announced its intentions to buy 25% of 
Powertech’s shares for US$600 million – a move that would make it Powertech’s single largest shareholder. 
This move came immediately after Tsinghua hired Charles Kau – who is Taiwanese and was previously the 
head of Micron’s (an American high-tech company’s) joint venture in Taiwan – as its global executive vice-
president, with the hopes of enabling more merger and acquisition talks (Shih & Wu, 2015). Unlike SPIL, 
this move appears to have received a relatively warm reception with Powertech’s management and 
shareholder, as it was hoped that the acquisition would help Powertech expand its operations in China 
(Shih & Wu, 2015). As such, on January 15, 2016, Powertech’s shareholders agreed to the deal; leaving 
government approval as the final step before the sale could take place (Chips on their Shoulders, 2016). 
However, after the election of President Tsai – and the resulting change in approach to investments from 
the Mainland – the authorities stalled with their approval for the next year. As such, on January 13, 2017 
Powertech opted to voluntarily abandon the deal a few days before its expiry date (the agreement would 
automatically expire after one year if it did not get shareholder or regulatory approval) (Wu, 2017a).  
While Powertech stated it would seek opportunities of future cooperation with Tsinghua in the future, 
the move appears to be a major defeat for Tsinghua as this offer progressed furthest than with SPIL (Wu, 
2017a). As such, it appears that even with a company’s consent, major Chinese investments in Taiwanese 
high-tech firms face large obstacles from the Taiwanese state.   
 
Implications for the Research Question 
 
 Once again, the research seems to indicate that social and political concerns strongly impact a 
Taiwanese company’s approach to Chinese investment. The research revealed that Powertech 
experienced fluctuating growth over the last five years. This naturally produced a strong eagerness to 
approve Tsinghua’s investment proposal as it would mean a large inflow of funds. Powertech went even 
further than SPIL furthest to realize this aspiration by gaining approval from its shareholders for the 
agreement (SPIL did not even put the proposal to a vote). However, due to delays from the regulatory 
side, the company opted to withdraw from the agreement a few days before it automatically expired. This 
presented a tremendous loss of opportunity to raise funds for a firm that had been struggling to attain 
sustained, year-on-year growth. As such, Powertech’s case appears to be an even greater loss for the firm 
than was the case for SPIL – which will likely realize synergies18 from their merger with ASE – as they did 
not achieve any kind of alternative solution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 i.e. improvements in efficiency, innovation, etc. resulting from combined resources and knowledge.  
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ChipMOS Technology Inc. (ChipMOS) 
 
Company Overview 
 
 Founded in 1997 in Hsinchu, ChipMOS is currently a major assembler and tester of both memory 
products and LCD drivers19 (ChipMOS Technology Inc., 2017). Within a year of its founding, ChipMOS 
established its first subsidiary in Japan, and quickly expanded into its new office and production facilities 
in Taiwan) (ChipMOS Technology Inc., 2017). Over the following years, the company expanded its product 
offering, frequently entering into joint ventures with other high-tech companies (ChipMOS Technology 
Inc., 2017). In 2005, ChipMOS merged with Chantek Electronic Co., Ltd. (another Taiwanese assembly and 
testing firm), with the joint company retaining ChipMOS’s name (ChipMOS Technology Inc., 2017). In April 
2014, the company finally went public on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, and in the following year, merged 
with ThaiLin Semiconductor Corp. (with which they established a joint venture in the past) (ChipMOS 
Technology Inc., 2017). The company employs 5,560 people (as of the end of 2016) at its four facilities, of 
which two are in Hsinchu, one is in Tainan, and one is in Shanghai (China) (ChipMOS Technology Inc., 2017). 
The company has undergone some restructuring in 2016, with a simplification of the corporate structure 
and the buy-back of 30 million shares (at a total price of NTD 1 billion) (ChipMOS Technology Inc., 2017). 
 
Key Financials  
Source: ChipMOS Technology Inc., 2017.           Source: ChipMOS Technology Inc., 2017. 
 
Figure 26 reveals that, while ChipMOS’s revenues have not really grown in the last 5 years, neither 
have the firm’s costs; resulting in relatively similar profits year-on-year. Conversely, total assets seem to 
be fluctuating every year, with the company’s public listing and various restructuring activities likely to be 
the cause of this (primarily due to changes in current assets). Regarding Figure 27, it is clear that the 
majority of ChipMOS’s sales occur in Taiwan – with Singapore and the rest of the world far out-ranking 
China in terms of volume.  
                                                          
19 A driver is a semiconductor that enables interfacing (i.e. the exchange of information) between two separate 
computing systems. With regards to LCD drivers, they enable interfacing between an integrated circuit (i.e. a chip) 
and the LCD display (screen).  
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Source: ChipMOS Technology Inc., 2017. 
Note: The 2016 Annual Report did not include ratios for 2012, therefore these were calculated by the author. As no average 
inventory figures were provided, therefore the author also omitted the 2012 value for average inventory turnover. 
 
 Figure 28 shows that ChipMOS’s performance has been highly volatile in the past few years. 
ChipMOS’s debt ratio20 has experienced dramatic shifts over the past few years, especially between 2015 
and 2016 where it jumped almost 10%. Although this fluctuation could imply that a number of changes 
have occurred, it is most likely tied to the dramatic change in total asset values experienced in the 2014-
2016 period (as evident in Figure 26). Nonetheless, the firm’s debt ratio remains considerably high 
(especially in 2016), which once again implies that the firm could potentially face liquidity problems 
(leading to possible bankruptcy) in the near future. With regards to return on assets21, a similar trend 
appears to be occurring, but with the ratio values dropping steeply after 2014. Since total assets is once 
again used in the calculation of this ratio, this shift appears to be once again due to the dramatic changes 
in total assets previously outlined. Furthermore, the shifts in the net profit margin22 figures attest to the 
fact that ChipMOS’s ability to turn revenues into profits fluctuate year-on-year, even when revenues 
remain steady (refer to Figure 26). While this could be attributed primarily to large, short-term expenses 
(as was likely the case from the restructuring occurring over the last few years), it could also point to the 
inability of the firm to manage its expenses. Whatever the case, the situation becomes ominous when one 
considers the fact that ChipMOS’s average inventory turnover23 has been recently decreasing, meaning 
that the firm is moving less inventory every year, than it did in the past. While this does not necessarily 
have to be a negative conclusion as long as the products’ prices are relatively higher, or the firm transitions 
                                                          
20 Debt ratio = total liabilities / total assets. It shows the proportion of loans to assets (and therefore the firm’s 
financial health). 
21 Return on total assets = income (i.e. profit) before interest and taxes / total assets. It shows the firm’s 
effectiveness at using assets to produce profit 
22 Net profit margin = net income (i.e. profit) / revenue. It shows how much of every NTD earned ends up as profit.  
23 Average inventory turnover = cost of goods sold (i.e. value of production) / average inventory. It shows how 
many times inventory is sold that year. 
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to higher value-added goods in general, the slight drops in revenue values (see Figure 2) seem to indicate 
that this transition is likely not the case (or that it is occurring too slowly).   
 
Interactions with Mainland China 
 
 Although only 1.2% of ChipMOS’s 2016 sales were in China, it appears that the country is the 
firm’s next major target market. ChipMOS began its operations on the Mainland with the founding of its 
subsidiary in Shanghai, China in 2002, and began assembly and testing in 2005 after the construction of 
its plant (About ChipMOS Shanghai, n.d.). Over the years, this subsidiary began expanding the scope of its 
operations in China, producing an ever increasing number of products (ChipMOS News and Events, n.d.).  
 
 In December 2015, Tsinghua announced its intentions to purchase 25% of ChipMOS’s shares for 
US$373 million) (Dou, 2015). However, similarly to SPIL and Powertech, ChipMOS prematurely abandoned 
the deal due to the uncertainty of regulatory approval. Nevertheless, unlike the previous two firms, 
ChipMOS was able to quickly negotiate and approve a replacement deal, where instead of purchasing 
shares in the parent company, Tsinghua agreed to buy a 54.98% stake in ChipMOS Shanghai for US$72.36 
million (Wu, 2016b). The company announced it plans to reinvest approximately US$70 million of this sum 
back into ChipMOS Shanghai in order to continue expanding its operations on the Mainland. The deal was 
completed on March 24, 2017 (ChipMOS Shanghai Equity Interest Transfer, 2017). Therefore, unlike the 
previous two firms, ChipMOS found a creative solution to by-pass the political uncertainty in Taiwan; 
allowing it to receive the capital funds it needs to improve its competitiveness.  
 
Implications for the Research Question 
 
 Once again, the research appears to reveal that even a struggling Taiwanese company will bend 
under social and political pressures regarding investments from the Mainland; although, unlike the other 
two cases, ChipMOS eventually managed to find a somewhat ‘middle ground’ solution. From the research 
it became apparent that ChipMOS had been struggling to produce any kind of growth over the last five 
years. However, when the bid to buy its shares was withdrawn (due to uncertainty of regulatory approval), 
the company was able to quickly present an alternative solution that resulted in its Chinese operations 
being turned into a joint venture with the same emerging Chinese high-tech firm that sought to buy a 
share in its overall operations: Tsinghua. As such, not only was ChipMOS able to secure additional funding 
(abet much smaller than the original amount), it formed a formal link with a firm that could potentially 
help it expand the scope and volume of its operations on the Mainland – potentially saving its stagnant 
performance. For these reasons, one can argue that this case showed the greatest success of the three 
due to the largest gains relative to the firm’s starting position (especially with regards to potential benefits 
from stronger links in China). As such, this case follows the general pattern made evident thus far (i.e. 
domestic Taiwanese political pressures seemed to outweigh economic benefits), but with the caveat that 
ChipMOS still managed to establish some investment links with Tsinghua by changing the setting in which 
these linkages were occurring from Taiwan to China. Given that ChipMOS preformed the poorest of the 
three cases in the last five years, this appears to indicate that under greater economic stress Taiwanese 
companies will go to greater lengths to seek desperately-needed investment (which the first part of the 
research component revealed is increasingly coming from the Mainland). While this is only a singular case 
(and therefore not necessarily replicable in all cases), it would still appear that China does indeed wield 
some power over Taiwanese firms due to its increasingly large clout with regards to Taiwan’s trade and 
foreign investment landscape by encouraging behaviours that (at least in a small way) go against the 
dominant political attitudes on the island.  
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Summary of Part 2 
 
Taiwan’s competitive advantage in the high-tech sector – i.e. its ability to sell high-quality products at 
low costs (due to cheaper labour) – is being steadily eroded by emerging economies, like China, who are 
upgrading their productive capabilities. Taiwan wants to move towards “innovation-driven growth”, 
which requires large sums of money in order to expand research and development (R&D). While the 
majority of Chinese FDI in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector goes to high-tech firms, only a small portion of 
Chinese FDI is directly used for R&D or venture capital (which is crucial for growing an innovative high-
tech sector). 
 
With 27% of sales in China in 2016, SPIL has experienced a steady growth, slightly fluctuating growth 
in revenues and profit over the last 5 years. Total assets have fluctuated but with a general positive trend. 
The analysis of key ratios reveals SPIL is increasingly over-leveraged, with the return on assets and net 
profit margin fluctuating, but growing in a largely positive manner. Inventory turnover has decreased, 
meaning SPIL is progressively selling less inventory than before. Plans for Tsinghua to buy a 24.9% stake 
in SPIL failed due to political uncertainty and an aggressive takeover attempt made by ASE, SPIL’s 
competitor and largest shareholder. Eventually SPIL merged with ASE, with each firm operating separately 
under one common holding company. 
 
With 1.8% of sales in China in 2016, Powertech has experienced fluctuating growth in revenues and 
profits, with total assets growing in a relatively steady manner.  The ratio analysis shows that Powertech’s 
performance has been gradually improving, with the debt ratio being relatively stable and return on assets 
and net profit margin growing in a gradual manner (except for the outlier year, 2013). Like SPIL, 
Powertech’s inventory turnover has been decreasing over the years, implying that less of the company’s 
goods are being sold than in previous years. In spite of management and shareholder approval, Tsinghua’s 
plan to buy 25% of Powertech’s shares failed due to the lack of a regulatory decision. 
 
With 1.2% of sales in China in 2016, ChipMOS’s revenues and profits have remained broadly stable, 
with effectively no considerable year-on-year growth. Total assets have fluctuated. The ratio analysis 
underlines this trend by reinforcing the firm’s fluctuating performance. The debt ratio, the return on 
assets, and the net profit margin have oscillated considerably, with the inventory turnover trending 
downwards. While Tsinghua’s bid to buy 25% of ChipMOS failed due to uncertainties regarding regulatory 
approval, the company was able to quickly negotiate and approve a replacement deal where Tsinghua 
would buy a 54.98% stake in its subsidiary in China (effectively creating a joint venture). The agreement 
was executed successfully in March 2017.  
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Part 3: Analysis 
 
 Having examined the political and economic context of Sino-Taiwanese relations, it is now 
appropriate to analyze these results as a whole in order to determine what they seem to suggest with 
regards to the research question.  
 
 Overall, the first part reveals that Taiwan is in an increasingly strenuous macroeconomic situation. 
While Taiwan’s GDP and GDP per capita has continued to grow, these indicators has increasingly grown 
at a slower pace; effectively not expanding at all. Taiwan’s economy has been based on exporting 
successively higher value-added goods. However, its competitive advantage as a cheap source of high 
value-added high-tech products is quickly diminishing as emerging economies (especially China) upgrade 
their productive capabilities. The government – which has played a major role throughout Taiwan’s 
economic development – appears to be trying to alleviate this in large part by focusing its efforts on 
Taiwan’s emerging trade and investment partner: China. As Figures 7 and 8 revealed, even before the 
liberalization of trade under the ECFA, China rose to become Taiwan’s largest trade partner at an 
astonishing pace, especially regarding exports, where it’s 2016 value was nearly twice that of the second 
largest export partner, Hong Kong. The same can be said for inward FDI, which after the 2009 liberalization 
increasingly only flowed into Taiwan from the Mainland. As such, it is completely understandable why the 
Taiwanese government has sought economic integration: bilateral economic relations with China have 
effectively become the single most important factor in Taiwan’s export-led growth model. Therefore, 
resisting better relations with the Mainland is no longer economically feasible given the current state of 
affairs. This is especially true considering the fact that, as was shown in Figures 13 through 15, Taiwan’s 
economy is still highly based on the production of high-tech goods (many of which are used in the 
production of final products in China).  
 
 The second part reveals that the apprehensiveness of Taiwan’s political and social spheres 
towards Mainland investment on the island has resulted in real negative consequences for Taiwan’s 
increasingly stagnant high-tech sector. The research revealed that Taiwanese state has officially 
announced its intentions to move the country towards an innovation-led (as opposed to efficiency-led) 
growth model, where an upgrade of the high-tech sector is a crucial component. This requires a number 
of factors to be in place, of which fostering entrepreneurship and innovative projects constitutes a crucial, 
money-intensive portion. While the much-needed Chinese FDI mostly goes to the high-tech sector (within 
the manufacturing portion of the economy), this is eclipsed by what the Chinese are investing in the retail 
and wholesale sector (which, while the largest component of the economy, is relatively less important for 
Taiwan’s future growth). The case studies reveal a major reason for this: Taiwan’s political situation is 
impacting major Chinese investors from successfully investing in Taiwan’s high-tech firms. Part 1 revealed 
that Taiwan’s industrial landscape is highly fragmented amongst small and medium-sized, family-owned 
firms, which means that even the total acquisition of an average firm only marginally impacts the whole 
industry. However, social and political pressures have made even these kinds of investments difficult. For 
this reason, while each of the three cases presented different intracompany realities, nonetheless, in each 
cases the outcome was the same: failure to approve the proposed investment.  
 
 In the case of SPIL, threats of a hostile takeover and the need for new capital seemingly fuelled 
the initial desire for Chinese investment. However, the lack of regulatory approval and a generally hostile 
political environment (especially due to the concurrent presidential elections, where the implications of 
closer economic ties with China were a central issue) compelled SPIL to abandon its plans, and negotiate 
with the firm that had previously made aggressive bids to take it over: ASE. Similarly, in the case of 
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Powertech, fluctuating and unstable growth lead the firm to pursue a large investment from Tsinghua. In 
fact, Powertech’s management went even further than the other two by obtaining shareholder approval 
(the second last major step in the process). However, delays in obtaining regulatory approval (due to a 
tense political situation) once again forced the firm to abandon the proposed investment. While 
ChipMOS’s case is broadly similar to both of the previously-mentioned firms in that the firm was ultimately 
forced to decline the investment bid due to the uncertainty of regulatory approval, the firm ended up 
finding a partial solution by transforming its China-based operations into a joint venture with Tsinghua. 
While the funds they received from this agreement were much smaller than the originally proposed 
investment, nonetheless, this move will likely help reinvigorate ChipMOS’s struggling operations by 
strengthening its links with China’s high-tech sector. This fact is especially important considering that the 
research revealed that ChipMOS was preforming the poorest of the three cases.  
 
All this research seem to be hinting at the fact that economic integration is a necessity given 
Taiwan’s current economic position, and that the anxieties surrounding its potential political implications 
are hurting the firms that are crucial to Taiwan’s future growth. Given this paper’s working definition of 
economic integration24, the cultural ties between the two states could potentially enable integration at 
level deeper that is commonly found in the international sphere. This of course does not necessarily 
translate into political reunification; only that Taiwan could benefit more than most countries from China’s 
present economic transformation. While the literature review revealed that it is hard to find a single 
metric that clear delineates the depth and/or scope of integration (and by extension its merits), Balassa’s 
claim regarding the dynamic effect of integration is highly relevant for the Sino-Taiwanese case. According 
to him, the most important aspect for evaluating the benefits of economic integration is determining if 
and how it expands the possible national income (i.e. GDP) given present resources. In other words, how 
integration helps expand what is currently economically achievable; and not merely produce at what is 
currently economically achievable. While this can only be stated at a general level, the research appears 
to indicate that Taiwan is in need of more than just producing efficiently (which is has been doing for a 
while), it needs to expand its economy altogether if it  wants to grow. While China is not the only option, 
the research from the first part appears to indicate that China has already become Taiwan’s closest 
economic partner in the international sphere due to deepening integration. This makes further 
cooperation the quickest way to attaining this required growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 economic integration is the abolition of economic discrimination within an area, with the level of abolition 
determined by the depth, type, and governance structure of the framework (formal and informal) that enables this 
integration 
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Conclusion 
  
 Having examined the research, the last remaining step is to examine everything through the prism 
of the research question in order to see how it all helps answer the question’s central concern: if economic 
integration is indeed threatening Taiwanese state’s political future. Once again, the research question 
reads: 
 
In the period between 2009 and 2016, to what extent has economic integration between 
Mainland China and Taiwan – especially in the high-tech sector – brought Taiwan closer 
to political reunification with the Mainland? 
 
The variety of evidence present here appears to indicate that while economic integration has been 
consistently deepening, the fear of political consequences continuously counterbalanced it – especially 
with regards to Taiwan’s key sector: high-tech. As such, with regards to the research question, the current 
level of integration does not appear to have led to any concrete steps towards reunification since 
economic integration purportedly intensified after cross-strait investment was permitted in 2009 (i.e. the 
period being examined) until the end of 2016.  
 
While Chinese officials have made it clear that reunification is one of the Chinese state’s most 
important long-term foreign policy goals, and that economic channels serve a crucial role in accomplishing 
this goal, the research appears to indicate that the Chinese state is considerably far from accomplishing 
this objective. While first part of the research suggests that China had successfully become Taiwan’s most 
important trading and foreign investment partner, the second part indicates that domestic social and 
political pressures are relatively more powerful on Taiwanese firms in the high-tech sector. That is, 
domestic political pressures are more powerful that those from China on the sector that has been 
designated to lead future growth.  Although the research is limited to only three cases – and therefore by 
no means a definitive representation of the high-tech sector – nonetheless, they are especially pertinent 
when one considers that in each case Tsinghua’s investment proposals appear to benefit both these 
struggling firms (by providing the capital necessary for innovation) and the Taiwanese government’s 
economic policy (by igniting capital-intensive, innovation-led growth). If one takes Tanner’s (2007) model 
for assessing Taiwan’s vulnerability to economic coercion from China from the literature review25, it 
becomes clear that while China has become very important to Taiwan’s economy (leading to severe 
negative repercussions if Taiwan were to forgo these relations), Taiwanese policy makers (especially those 
who were recently  elected on a tidal wave of cautionary sentiments) have become increasingly effective 
at minimizing China’s economic leverage over the island. These cases reveal that, even in the face of a 
stagnant economy, Taiwanese policy makers (and the general public) are acutely aware of how greater 
direct control over Taiwanese firms by Chinese state-affiliated companies might potentially impact the 
state’s ability to resist economic pressures. As such, the research appears to indicate that while economic 
integration has intensified in the 2009-2016 period, the Taiwanese state (and society) are still willing to 
forgo economic benefits if they are perceived to threaten the state’s independence. For this reason, it 
does not appear that economic integration in recent years has not produced sufficient momentum to 
seriously threaten political reunification.   
                                                          
25 i.e. Taiwan’s vulnerability to economic coercion from China is affected by, one, the relative importance of China 
on Taiwan’s economy, two, Taiwan’s ability to forego economic relations with China (in the event of a dispute), 
three, the effectiveness of Taiwanese policy makers in minimizing China’s economic leverage, and four, the specific 
nature of Beijing’s demands (especially in the context of historic relations). 
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